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Abstract , 
It is well known that "escalated" tariff structures • 
in more developed countries (MDCs) s£rve to inhibit the 
ability of less developed countries (LDCs) to process""their 
own primary commodities for .export. • What has not received 
attention, however, and what is demonstrated here, is that 
tariff structures of the LDCs, themselves, may add an additional 
bias against such processing activities. So reform of 
protection systems in both groups of countries is important"* 
to the success of industrialisation in LDCs. The terms of 
trade implications are noted as a possible explanation of the^ 
UNCTAD emphasis on trade preferences in MDC markets rather 
than on LDC tariff-reform,, However, it .is noted that .LDC 
tariff reform would tend to remove a bias,against trade among 
LDCs and that this mitigates the terms of trade argument. 
Finally, this also provides a new-argument for trade 
preferences among LDCs. \ 
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A Note on Protection and the 
Processing of Primary Commodities 
by 
John E. Power 
Tariff structures in less developed countries (LDCs) and sore 
developed countries (lOCs) alike .generally exhibit the characteristic 
of "cascading" rates—highest at. the finishing stages of production and 
lowest at the primary stages. It has often been pointed out that the 
effect of this kind of tariff structure in MDCs is to inhibit the abil-
ity of LDCs to process their own primary products for export to the 
markets of the IDCs. If, for example, the latter allow copra to enter 
free of duty while coconut oil is subject to an import tax, what might 
be a natural comparative advantage of L X s in 'the processing of copra 
would tend to be nullified, keeping them dependent on the export of the 
primary product. It should be noted in this connection that even a 
modest nominal rate of protection can mean"ver3r substantial effective 
protection of the processing activity when the primary product is im-
ported free of duty. In these circumstances a 1G per cent nominal rate 
on the processed product, for example, would mean a 25 per cent effect-
ive rate if value added in processing (at world prices} represented 
40 per cent of the value of the final product (at world prices). 
This kind of bias in the protection structures of the HDCs 
represents a serious obstacle tc the development of manufactured exports 
in the LDCs. What has not received attentic-n, however, is the fact 
that protection systems in the LDCs often impose an additional penalty 
on the processing of primary commodities for export. Thus protection 
systems in both groups of countries combine to create a double-edged 
bias in favour of continued dependence of the LDCs on primary commodity 
exports. 
The bias against processing of domestic commodities that is 
imposed (inadvertently, no doubt) bjr the LDCs, themselves, comes from 
one or both of two important consequences of their protection systems. 
First there is the general bias against exports in favour of import 
substitution.' 'Jhile the latter is often heavily protected, exports 
generally have negative net effective protection. Second is the bias 
in 'savour of the use of internationally traded inputs over non-traded 
ones that results from the undervaluation of foreign exchange that the \ 
system of protection defends. 
If we consider two goods, a primary commodity and the pr 
duct resulting from its being processed, and if we consider that the 
primary commodity might be exported or not, while the processed pro-
duct might be exported or substituted for imports behind protection, 
we have four possible combinations. In order to determine the exist-
ence and nature of the bias against the processing cf domestic commodi-
ties that the protection system imposes, we can compare each combination 
to an import substitution industry that is processing imported inputs 
behind protection. 
First, if the primary commodity is not .exported, industries 
that use it as an input will be at a disadvantage vis a vis import 
substitution industries that use imported inputs because of the under-
valuation of foreign exchange. (Imported inputs are assumed to have 
aero or low duties in accordance with the "escalated" protection struc-
ture.) This would be true even if the processed product were also a 
protected import substitute. If, however, the processed product is an 
export, there will be a double disadvantage owing to the negative pro-
tection of exporting activities. (ITote that even if there were fully 
effective drawbacks of duties on protected inputs, exporting activi-
ties would still have negative net effective protection because of the 
undervaluation of foreign exchange.) On the other hand, if the primary 
commodity is exported, its price also will be lower because of the 
undervaluation of foreign exchange, so that its processing is at a 
disadvantage only if, and because, it produces a product for export. 
These results are summarised in Table 1, where the nature of the bias, 
if any, Is shown in the appropriate coll. 
able I 
Biases Against r'rocessing of Domestic Commodities 
Processed Good 
Export Import Substitut 
Primary 
Commodity 
Export negative protection of exports 
no bias 
No both biase undervaluation of 
imported inputs Export 
Perhaps the most important case is that in the upper left-
hand corner, where both primary and processed products would be exported. 
It night, therefore, prove interesting to loci at this case core closely. 
I propose to do sc within a framework of analysis patterned after that 
of Eollis Chenery in his classic article, "Comparative Advantage and 
Development Policy" (American Economic Review, March 1961) . The case-
considered here is patterned after an actual case in the Philippines, 
though the numbers have been selected for convenience in arithmetic. 
Table 2 shows input-output relations for three-production 
activities, • two export activities, and two import activities. For 
example, production activity 3 produces (+) l . C unit of plywood and 
uses (-) l.C unit of logs and 1.3 units of primary inputs (labour and 
other inputs). Export activity 3 uses (-) l.C unit of plywood to pro-
duce (+) 2.C units of foreign exchange. Import activity 1 produces (+) 
1.0 unit of autos and uses (-) 11.0 units of foreign exchange. 
Table 2 -
• Plywood versus Automobile- Assembly-
Production 
1 3 4 
Export 
3 4 
Imp o r 
1 
t 
2 
Di'se-
c*ui1i— 
brium 
Imp. 
Sub. 
.jXT.ort 
Exp. I 
Export 
Exp.II 
1 Autos +1.0 +1.0 . 11.0 13.2 12.1 13.2 
2 CIQs -1.0 +1.0 IC .0 10.C 11. c 12.0 
3 Plywood +1.0 -1.0 2.2 o o ^ « 2.2 2.4 
4 Logs -1.0 + 1.0 -1.C l.C 1.0 l.C 3L.2 
5 Foreign +2.0 +1.0 -11.0 -10.0 l.C 1.0 Jl . JL 1.2 
Exchange 
Labour -0.6 — •^•Q 1.0 1.0 1.0 l.C • 
Cther -I <C -0.5 -0.5 l.C 1.0 l.C l.C 
inputs -
Profitabil ity * 9 % tax on expo rts 
Disecui 
librium 
-2.0 0 0 -0.2 . 0 0 c * * no tax on exports 
Imp. Sub- +0.2 c 0 -0.2 0 0 c 
stitution 
Exp. Ex- -1.9 0 ,0- 0 0 0 c 
pansion I 
-1.8 c +0.-2 0 0 ' 0 0 
pansion II -
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The rate of logging is restricted by the nee:1, tc maintain the 
forests. It is assumed that this rate of logging will permit log exports 
just sufficient to earn the foreign exchange needed for the import of 
C D s (complete knocked-down assemblies) to meet the domestic demand for 
autos. If, however, autos were to be imported instead of CZDs, more 
foreign exchange would be needed. Mote that export earnings can be 
expanded by diverting logs to plywood manufacture for export. A unit 
of logs'earns twice as much foreign exchange in the form of plywood, 
but the cost of primary inputs required to convert logs to plywood is 
such that it does not pay to do so at an exchange rate (price of foreign--' 
exchange) of 1.0. The exchange rate must move at least to 1.1 before 
plywood exports become profitable. ("Profitable" here means earning at 
least the necessary return to capital.) 
It is assumed initially that the official exchange rate is l.C. 
At this rate autos can be imported at a price of 11.C (1I.Q units of 
foreign exchange multiplied by its price). Likewise, CKDs can be imported 
at a price of 10.C. Domestic production of autos would be at a unit 
cost of 13.0; hence their domestic assembly is unprofitable. The prices 
of autos and CEDs will be .determined, then, by their import prices. 
The prices of logs and plywood, in contrast, will be determined by the 
higher of domestic costs of production (including necessary return to 
capital, given the degree of-monopoly) or net export price. The prices 
of labour and other inputs can each be set at 1.0 by choosing approp-
riate units. The prices of logs; and plywood can then" be calculated as 
1.0 and 2.2, respectively. 
All of these prices are shown in the column headed "Disequi-
librium." Since only logs can profitably be exported at these prices, 
foreign exchange earnings will fall short of the amount required by 
auto imports. Eence there is balance of payments disequilibrium. 
Two ways of meeting this problem are considered. The first 
is to reduce the demand for- foreign exchange by protecting an auto' 
assembly industry—import substitution. The other is to increase the 
supply of foreign exchange by promoting plywood exp-orts—export expansion. 
To protect auto assembly a 20 per cent tariff is imposed on 
autos (CEDs remaining duty free)- The price of autos is now import price 
plus tariff, or 13.2. Df>K5estic production is now profitable. (Compare 
the profitability figures in column 1 under the heading, Production.) 
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Indeed, monopoly profits are indicated. Domestic competition could 
drive the price down to 13.C, leaving a portion of the tariff redundant. 
Nothing else has changed, except that the balance of payments is now 
in equilibrium—log exports by assumption being just sufficient to meet 
the foreign exchange requirements of importing CIQs. 
Alternatively, to increase export earnings so as to be able 
to continue duty-free imports of autos, the price of foreign exchange 
could be raised to 1.1. Now a unit of plywood export earns 2.2 in 
domestic currency, rather than 2.0; and this is just sufficient to 
induce plywood exports. (Compare the profitability figures in Export 
column 3.) Note also that log exports now earn rents. These could be 
taxed to prevent the domestic cost of logs from rising. Under the 
assumption of such a tax, prices would be as shown in column Expert 
Expansion I. If log exports are not taxed, the exchange rate would 
have to rise to 1.2, though a subsidy to plywood manufacture is an 
alternative. Prices under the assumption of no tax or subsidy are 
shown in column Export Expansion II. 
"That conclusions can we draw from this? First, recall that 
"escalated" tariff structures in rich countries can inhibit the devel-
opment in poor countries of export industries based on the processing 
of their primary products. ~7e now see how tariff structures in the 
poor countries can be an additional inhibiting factor. The protection 
of import substitution can defend an exchange rate that undervalues 
foreign exchange to the extent that naturally comparatively advantageous 
exports, such as plywood in the present case, cannot develop. The 
country remains dependent on the export of logs. 
I-Ioreover, the effect of an escalated tariff structure in 
creating exaggerated effective protection rates is again important in 
the LDC case. If, for example, the 20 per cent tariff "jere imposed on 
both imports, autos would not be produced domestically, as the reader 
can verify. It is the combination of a seemingly modest tariff on autos 
with duty-free imports of CK:3s at an undervaluation of foreign exchange 
that makes import substitution profitable here. VJith uniform tariffs 
the rate would have to be at least 200 per cent to induce import sub-
stitution. I wonder- how many policy makers who would balk at giving 
an industry 200 per cent protection fail to realise that this is in 
effect what they might be doing when, as in the present case, they 
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impose a 20 per cent duty on the product and allow the inputs to be 
imported free of duty. ... 
What is the effective rate of protection for auto assembly 
in the case described above? As usually calculated it is 22C per cent— 
the percentage difference between value added under protection and value 
added at world prices (3.2 is 220 per cent greater than 1.0). But world 
prices under protection are not the same as"equilibrium prices under 
free trade, when these are measured in domestic currency. Go we could 
calculate "net effective protection" which takes into account the ex-
change rate adjustment. 7e would compare the prices of autos and CKDs 
not in the first and second price columns, but in the second and third 
or second and fourth. Net effective protection with the export tax on 
logs, then, would be about 191 per cent; while without the export tax 
it would be about 157 per cent. Net effective protection is less than 
effective protection because a portion of the latter is offset by the 
undervaluation of foreign exchange. 
The key question is, however, which is the better social 
choice: import substitution in auto assembly cr expansion of plywood 
manufacture for export? Each auto acquired via import substitution 
costs 13.0 in primary inputs—10.0 to produce ten units of logs for 
export so as to be able to import one CIO plus 3.0 to assemble it. 
If, instead, autos are imported, one out of ten units of logs previ-
ously exported will have to go into plywood manufacture (since foreign 
exchange requirements have risen by ten per cent). So the average pri-
mary input cost per car will be 11.2 in this case—10.0 to produce ten 
units of logs plus 1.2 to convert one of them into plywood. 
The better social choice, then, is plywood. This conclusion 
would be further strengthened if we took into account the terms of 
trade advantage of exporting fewer logs and if we introduced a shadow 
price for labour. The- former depends, of course, on a lower world 
elasticity of demand for logs than for plywood. 'Jith respect to the 
latter, I am assuming a dualistic wage structure with rates fcr•compar-
able skills higher in manufacturing than in primary activities like 
logging. The analysis above was carried out under the assumption that 
the expansion of logging was limited by conservation policies. This 
restricted the choice to the processing of logs versus the 'assembly of 
CKDs. This is a reasonable approximation to a situation where the 
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supply of the primary commodity is relatively inelastic. If instead 
it is relatively elastic, there is a choice also between investing: in 
the expansion of primary production for export versus investing in its 
processing. Here the shadow wage could be an important factor. 
The example set out above is, of course, artificial in the 
sense that the numbers were to chosen to insure the result, as well as 
to r-ake the exposition simple. Nevertheless, it illustrates a real 
situation for many less developed countries. If auto assembly serves 
as a proxy for all protected import substitution, and plywood serves 
as a proxy for all potential exports based on the processing of domestic 
materials, we can see from the example that the protection of the former 
is at the expense of the latter. This does not depend on the particular 
numbers chosen, since the undervaluation of foreign exchange that pro-
tection of import substitution defends will inevitably destroy the 
profitability of some comparatively advantageous manufacturing for 
export. This, therefore, may be an important part of the explanation 
of why import substitution in manufacturing behind protection has not 
reduced the LDCs1 dependence on primary exports. The present xvriter 
is convinced that this is surely the case for the Philippines. 
Finally, let me address myself briefly to the question why 
the adverse influence of MDC protection on the LDCs' ability to export 
manufactures has received attention, while the additional adverse in-
fluence of the LDCs* own protection systems has not. This imbalance 
is particularly evident, I think, within UNCTAD. Recall that Raul 
Prebisch, in his first report in 19Q4 as Director-General of UNCTAD, 
strongly criticised "inward-looking industrialisation" and emphasised 
the importance of manufacturing for expert on the part of LDCs. To 
implement this redirection of industrialisation policy, however, the 
emphasis was entirely on revision of the protection systems in lOCs— 
none on reform within the LDCs, themselves. This emphasis cannot be 
attributed, I think, to a lack of understanding of the penalty on 
exports that protection imposes. Rather I think it is more likely 
that Frebisch had in mind the difference with respect to the terms of 
trade between "center" and "periphery" that is implied in the alter-
natives of trade preferences granted by MDCs versus reduced protection 
— i n LDCs. .For, while the latter would help to. unleash their indust-
rial export potential, for the- .entire LDC bloc to attempt this would 
surely mean terms of trade losses in the absence of simultaneous 
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.reduction of protection in KDCs. Ironically, however, the implement-
ation of UHCTAD trade preferences will benefit most those few LDCs ' 
that go ahead with the reform of their protection systems, notwith-
standing this argument. 
There is yet another consideration that tends to mitigate, 
1 think, the terms of trade argument. The UNCTAD view seems to be 
premised too heavily on the assumption of a two-bloc world, with the 
implication that increased exports from LDCs must go to II Cs rather 
than to other LDCs. Reinforcing this has been also a lack of attention 
to the effect of protection in LDCs in biasing against trade with each 
other in favour of trade with I-DCs. Since this has not been spelled 
out anywhere, so far as I know, 1 will devote a little space to it here. 
Put most simply this bias results from the fact that when two 
countries have similar rates of tariff (or equivalent import restric-
tion) protection they are defending similar rates of overvaluation of 
their currencies. (This assumes that the international trade elasti-
cities are also similar for the two countries.) Thus they have over-
valued currencies in relation to the world, but not in relation to each 
other. There is, therefore, no offset to the tariff in trade with each 
other, while the effect of the tariff is reduced by the undervaluation 
of foreign exchange in the case of imports from the world. This means 
that the world is given a competitive advantage \ '.s a vis each in sales 
in the other's market. 
Let me put this more precisely in a simple example. Let 3 
represent the bloc cf countries with identical levels of protection and 
rates of overvaluation; and let A represent any member cf ths bloc. 
Assume that with this protection there are still imports from the world, 
though less than there would be with free trade. Prices of imports in 
A will be equal to the world price raised by the tariff and converted 
at the exchange rate. Compared to prices under free trade, import price 
will be higher by "net Protection"—the combined effect of the tariff 
and the undervaluation of foreign exchange. Thus if free trade prices 
are F, prices under protection will be F (1 + T) (1 - U), where T is the 
tariff rate and U is the rate of undervaluation. Cf course the pro-
tection will mean that domestic producti OH in Jra v/ill partially displace 
imports, but at the new equilibrium exporters from B to A will receive 
the pries discounted by the tariff, or F (1 + T) (1 - U) ( 1 m ) = F (1 - U) , 
while exporters from the world to A will receive the same raised by the 
overvaluation of A's currency, or F (1 - U) ( - . " ) = F. Imports into A 
JL — u 
from the world will, therefore, tend to displace those from 5. Export-
ers in A, on the other hand, will find their net export price lower 
than under free trade by the extent of undervaluation of foreign ex-
change both for sales to the world and to bloc members. The net result 
for each member of adopting these common protectionist policies is, 
then, to reduce imports and exports generally and to bias the source 
of imports toward the world, away from bloc members. 
The implication is that a simultaneous reduction of protection 
among all bloc B countries would tend to remove this bias and increase 
trade with each other. This would at least mitigate, then, the terms 
of trade effect noted above. 
My conclusion from all of the above is that, while a reduc-
tion of protection in MDCs vis a vis the manufactures of LDCs is of 
great importance, the reform of protection systems within LDCs should 
not wait for this to happen. It seems also that there is an additional 
argument for accomplishing this within the framework of preferential 
trade among those LDCs that have found themselves trapped by inwdrd-
looking industrialisation behind protection—namely the removal of an 
unnatural bias against trade with each other. There no reason, of 
course, for this preferential trade to be restricted to regional group-
ings. And, finally, such an arrangement might^'provide the LDCs with 
a stronger bargaining position on the question of KDC protection. 
